Portada e índice, Vol. LIII, Número 136
Introduction
David Suárez-Rivero. Insights on Gottlob Frege’s Puzzle
How a sentence is knowable to be true
Stavroula Glezakos. Revisiting “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?”
Reflections on Frege’s Puzzle
Genoveva Martí. Informativeness and multiple senses
Come back to the tables
Marco Ruffino.Frege’s Puzzle: Can we pose it on Frege’s Behalf?
André Leclerc. Frege’s Puzzle, Ordinary Proper Names, and Individual Constants
Ludovic Soutif. In what sense is Frege’s (Statement of the) Puzzle “problematic”?
Epistemic profiles
Lourdes Valdivia.Recognizing the Referent
Max A. Freund C. Is “a=a” known a posteriori?
Víctor Cantero-Flores. Frege’s puzzle and the a priori
Intentionality
Gregory Bochner. Posing Frege’s Puzzle Without Presupposing Linguistic Senses
Alexandre Billon y Marie Guillot. Can Fregeans have ‘I’-thoughts?
Sílvio Mota Pinto. Intentionality and Frege’s Puzzle
Anaphora
Manuel García-Carpintero. Understanding Anaphoric Dependence: A Reply to Glezakos
Kepa Korta. A simple theory of proper names
Emiliano Boccardi. Frege’s Puzzle: Much Ado about Nothing?
Semantic and epistemic puzzle
Dirk Greimann. The Semantic Significance of Frege’s Puzzle
Fregeans and Non-Fregeans
Leandro De Brasi. Cognitive Value and Natural Language Proper Names